This paper surveys and analyzes the state of the art of buyer coalition mechanisms, paying attention to single item and bundle of items aspects. From the exits buyer coalition schemes, the solution concepts of their mechanisms are concerned with are related to both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. Finally, we conclude by discussing the future directions of buyer coalition mechanisms.
Introduction
Online group buying is an effective marketing method. By using online group buying, buyers can improve their bargaining power and negotiate more advantageously with sellers in purchasing goods at lower prices [22] . In addition, online group buying helps to reduce the cost of communication between buyers and a seller. This not only meets buyer demand, but also benefits sellers to sell the items at larger bundles via online group buying. Almost all of existing buyer coalition schemes focus on their mechanism, the strategies used to select the final outcome based on participation strategies [10] . The one of significant mechanism properties is solution concepts. The solution concepts of the mechanism properties are concerned with are related to both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. While cooperative game theory focuses on what groups of buyers can achieve rather than what individuals can do, noncooperative game theory aims to design a game that achieves the desired social outcome even when buyers are self-interested. To develop efficiency new buyer coalition schemes, we believe that the buyer coalition mechanism is needed. Against this background, the aim of this paper is to motivate the design of mechanism in buyer coalition, to highlight the properties that mechanisms can and are fulfilling in this domain. In more detail, the rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the background and related works. Section 3 describes the buyer coalition in single item. Section 4 performs a similar analysis for bundle of items. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
Background and Related Works

N-person Coalitional Game Theory
N-person coalitional game theory is divided into two branches according to binding agreements of players: Non-cooperative game theory and Cooperative game theory.
Non-cooperative game theory
Non-cooperative game theory deals with situations where the players are not feasible binding agreements. The theory concentrates on the strategic options of individual players. Social Welfare describes the overall utility of society. The idea of Social Welfare is to provide a normative logic for making social decision when the individual member of the society has several choices. The social welfare function is a function that combines individual members-utilities to the societal utility as large as possible. Another normative logic for making social decision is Pareto optimality. An outcome of members in a society is Pareto optimality if there are no choices of outcome which can make at least one member in the society better off, without making any other member worse off. A Nash equilibrium [18] is a set of strategies such that no player gets more benefit from changing only his own strategy while the other players do not change their strategies. A Nash equilibrium might be or might not be Pareto optimal because it implies that all players would be better off.
Cooperative game theory
Cooperative game theory deals with situations where the players can make binding agreements. The theory invokes a sense of a competition between coalitions of players, rather than between individual players. The set of players, called a coalition, cooperate to approach a particular goal. An individual player's benefit in a coalition is more than his benefit without the cooperation of any other players. A stable set is the first proposed solution for cooperative game theory [20] . The idea of the Stable set is to provide a set of stable outcomes which satisfies two conditions: (1) for every outcome it is not stable if some existing coalitions can be dominated and (2) there is no coalition that can dominate any stable outcome. The stable set does not compare the dominance of any coalitions in the same imputation but the core [17] is an appropriate solution for such condition and it is a subset of every stable set. The core of a coalition game is a set of imputations in which no subset of players has incentive to opt for an alternative coalition formation. Since both a stable set and the core give a set of solutions, the Shapley value [19] is developed to give a unique solution. The payoffs of players depend on their contributions to a coalition. However, the solution of the Shapley value does not limit only players in the coalition but it considers players in N .The idea of the Shapley value is to provide a stable outcome which satisfies two conditions: (1) You should give me more gains, otherwise I will leave the game, and (2) You should give me more gains, otherwise I will persuade the other players to exclude you from the game. Since these solutions (e.g. the stable set, the core, and the Shapley value) might be empty and they find it difficult to describe a real outcome, the bargain set [16] was developed and it cannot be the empty set. Moreover, the core is a subset of the bargain set. The bargain set is the set of the players' payoffs which no player has a justified (only) objection against without counter-object against of any other players.
Buyer Coalition Scheme
Group-buying motivates bargain hunters unwilling to pay full-price for a sales item, but are willing to wait a few days for a lower price to become available [9] . Group-buying exist both in commerce and in service industries, such as insurance, to pursue better deals for a group [9] . In general, all buyer coalition models include several stages [1] : Negotiation: The coalition leader or representative of the coalition negotiates with sellers to provide the goods or service. Leader Election/Voting: The members select a coalition leader for against certain bids. Not all coalition formation involve use of this stage. Coalition Formation: The coalition leader invites new members to join his coalition. It is significant to note that the coalition must have some admission constraints (such as their ability to pay for the goods.). Payment Collection: The coalition leader collects the payments from coalition members and is responsible for conveying the full amount to the sellers Execution/Distribution stage: They will distribute goods to the members of the coalition after a transaction is executed and the purchased goods arrive.
Buyer Coalition Mechanism
Mechanism design is the subfield of microeconomics and game theory. The mechanism design considers about implementation good system for multiple self-interested agents with having private information on their preferences [21] . In other words, a mechanism defines a set of possible agent strategies and an outcome rule [21] . The mechanism design has found many important applications such as in electronic market design. The group-buying auction mechanism is fundamentally different from the typical quantity discount mechanism [9] . First, group-buying closing prices typically decline monotonically in the total purchase quantities of participating buyers, and not just based on an individual buyer's purchase quantities. Second, in the quantity discount mechanism, to achieve a discount the buyer must order more than the threshold number of items required. In group-buying, the buyer can get the discount by ordering more herself or persuading other bidders to order more. The one of significant mechanism properties is solution concepts. The solution concepts of exists buyer coalition mechanism are concerned both cooperative and noncooperative game theory [10] . Cooperative game theory focuses on what groups of players can achieve rather than what individuals can do. As a result, it typically assumes complete information. On the other hand, mechanism design in non-cooperative game theory aims to design a game that achieves the desired social outcome even when agents are self-interested, strategic and have private information. Sometimes, the boundary between non-cooperative game theory and cooperative game theory is not always clear cut (because non-cooperative game theory is sometimes also involved in cooperating). For example, individual buyer seldom want to get discount as large as possible from forming a coalition, nevertheless, if the buyer coalition formation is failed, s/he can't get any discounts.
Buyer Coalitions with Single Item
In buyer coalition with single item, the solution concepts of their mechanism are related to both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. The cooperative game theory in exist buyer coalition schemes seldom use for group of buyers, while the non-cooperative game theory seldom use in order to negotiation between buyers and sellers. Table 1 shows the solution concepts of a number of exist buyer coalition mechanisms with single item.
In [2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10] , the solution concepts of their mechanisms will concern with cooperative game theory. While the J. Yamamoto and K. Sycara work [2] guarantees the stability in surplus division within each coalition in terms of the core in game theory, C. Li et al. work [10] include both stability (in the core) and incentive compatibility, a characteristic of mechanisms whereby individual knows that the best strategy is to follow the rules. C. Li et al. work [10] guarantees also incentive compatible because it harder for the buyers to compute the best possible strategies in practical. The buyers in both J. Chen et al. [6] and J. Chen et al. [9] works have dominant strategies for a buyer if it outcomes the best payoff (for that buyer) no matter what strategies the other buyers choose, but in Chen et al. work [9] consider also based on a Core F. Asselin and B. Chaib-Draa [3] Pareto-optimal S. Kraus et al. [4] Kernel and social welfare S. Kraus et al. [5] Marginal and expert heuristic J. Chen et al. [6] Weakly dominant strategy J. Chen et al. [7] -K. S. Anand, and R. Aron [8] -J. Chen et al. [9] Dominant strategy Nash equilibrium C. Li et al. [10] Core Nash equilibrium analysis of bidder strategies for a monopolist seller and a competitive seller. In addition, both S. Kraus et al.works cite4,5 have forming coalitions with incomplete information. The buyer coalition mechanism in S. Kraus et al. work [4] stable in social welfare and the heuristic of S. Kraus et al. work [5] is very close to an experimentally measured optimal value. In [7, 8] , the solution concepts of their mechanism will concern with non-cooperative game theory. J. Chen work [7] leads to a better understanding of how sellers can set their group-buying auction price curves more effectively. K. S. Anand work [8] analyzes the influence of different kinds of demand uncertainty on the seller's pricing strategies.
Buyer Coalition with Bundle of items
Compared with buyer coalitions with single item, buyers in buyer coalitions with bundle of items will place a bid with bundle of items. Forming a buyer coalition with bundle of items is generally more complex than those with single of item since they involve variety of each buyer's preference. There are various ways of viewing buyer coalitions with bundle of items [11, 12, 13, 14, 15] . Nevertheless, the solution concepts of their mechanism can be categorized into cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. Table 2 shows the solution concepts of a number of exist buyer coalition mechanisms with bundle of items. Table 2 : The solution concepts of buyer coalition mechanisms with bundle of items In [11, 13, 15] , the solution concepts of their mechanismwill concern with cooperative game theory. C. Li and K. Sycara work [11] , L. He and T. Ioerger work [13] , and L. Cuihongi et al. work [15] guarantee the stability in payoff division within each coalition in terms of the core in game theory. Nevertheless, the price of goods in C. Li and K. Sycara work [11] and L. Cuihongi et al. work [15] are different from those of L. He and T. Ioerger work [13] . In C. Li and K. Sycara work [11] and L. Cuihongi et al. work [15] , the price of goods is a [11] Core H. Linli and R. I. Thomas [12] Heuristic bundle search algorithm L. He and T. Ioerger [13] Core H. Fu-Shiung, L. Jim-Bon [14] Combinatorial reverse auction L. Cuihongi et al. [15] Heuristic algorithm function of the number of items sold in each transaction while the price of goods in L. He and T. Ioerger work [13] based on the total cost of all goods sold in one transaction. In [12, 14] , the solution concepts of their mechanism will concern with non-cooperative game theory. H. Fu-Shiung work [14] illustrates the advantage of group-buying-based combinatorial reverse auctions over multiple independent combinatorial reverse auctions and H. Linli and R. I. Thomas work proposes a heuristic bundle search algorithm for the buyers to find the optimal bundle.
Conclusion
This paper has surveyed and analyzed the state of the art in buyer coalition mechanism, focusing particularly on single item and bundle of items. While buyer coalition mechanisms are still very much in its infancy, a number of buyer coalition mechanisms have already been made. However, there are a number of major research challenges that still need to be overcome before the full potential of buyer coalition mechanisms can be met. These include: 1. The mechanism concerning data mining: Group buying has become extremely popular. Therefore, we should propose a data mining approach for exploring online group buying behavior. 2. The incentive mechanism with bundle of items: Due to the small number of orders that occur in the beginning of an online group-buying auction, many prospective participants are inclined to wait until the auction price for the sale item falls to an acceptable level. Only one exist buyer coalition research focus on incentive mechanism with single of item. However, we believe that incentive mechanism with bundle of item is very interesting for next step also.
